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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

E. MARLOWE GOBLE,

]

Plaintiff/Appellant,
i
]

Case No. 940268-CA

vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

]i
]

Priority No. 15

Defendant/Respondent.

]

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over plaintiff's appeal pursuant
to Utah Constitution, Article VIII, and Utah Code Ann, § 78-2-2.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Did

the

trial

court

properly

construe

the

State

Farm

insurance policy as allowing State Farm to discharge its obligation

by

fully

repairing

the physical

damage

to

plaintiff's

vehicle without paying plaintiff for the alleged diminution in
value to the vehicle?

This is a legal determination for which

the court gives no deference, but rather reviews for correctness.
Standard Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136,
1137 (Utah 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, or rules relevant to this appeal.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs

vehicle

was

damaged

by

plaintiff's

child.

Plaintiff made a claim for collision coverage under an insurance
policy purchased from defendant State Farm.

State Farm fully

repaired all of the physical damage to plaintiff's automobile and
returned plaintiff's vehicle to its original physical condition.
None of the repairs were defective.

Nonetheless, plaintiff

claims that, even though the vehicle was fully repaired, the cash
value of the vehicle is diminished because of its status as a
previously-damaged

automobile.

Plaintiff demanded that State

Farm pay plaintiff for the alleged diminution in value.

State

Farm denied plaintiff's demand for coverage on the grounds that
the State Farm policy does not extend coverage for diminution in
value when the physical damage to the vehicle has been fully
repaired.
Plaintiff filed suit, claiming that the State Farm policy
extends coverage for diminution in value.

Plaintiff eventually

moved for partial summary judgment on this issue.
State Farm

opposed the motion and

summary judgment.

filed

Defendant

its own motion

for

After full briefing and a hearing, the trial

court found that diminution in value is not a covered loss under
the State Farm policy and granted
Farm's favor.

summary

judgment

in State

Plaintiff filed this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The facts of this case are not in dispute.

Defendant State

Farm moved for summary judgment without supporting affidavits, as
2

authorized by Rule 56(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff did not contest any of the facts alleged in defendant's
memorandum.

Consequently, each of the facts asserted by defen-

dant were deemed to be admitted.

The relevant facts asserted in

defendant's summary judgment memorandum are set forth in paragraphs 1 through 11 below.

The remaining paragraphs of fact

summarize the events of the trial court.
1.

At all times material hereto, plaintiff was the owner

of a 1991 Mercedes automobile (hereinafter the "vehicle").

(R.

33) .
2.

At all times material hereto, plaintiff's vehicle was

insured by defendant State Farm.
3.

(R. 33).

On or about June 27, 1992, plaintiff's son lost control

of plaintiff's vehicle while driving down a canyon road, causing
the vehicle to wreck and sustain significant damage.
4.

Plaintiff

submitted

damage to his vehicle.
5.
able.

a claim to State Farm

(R. 33) .
for the

(R. 33).

The physical damage to plaintiff's vehicle was repair-

(R. 33).
6.

Defendant paid to have plaintiff's vehicle repaired.

(R. 33).
7.

The repairs restored plaintiff's vehicle to its former

physical condition and were not defective.
8.
restored

(R. 33) .

Plaintiff alleges that, although the repairs may have
his

vehicle

to

its

former

physical

condition,

the

repairs did not restore plaintiff's vehicle to its former market
3

value.

Plaintiff claims that the market value of his vehicle has

diminished

because

of the accident, even though

all

of the

physical damage caused by the accident has been repaired.

(R.

33) .
9.

Plaintiff made a demand upon State Farm for the diminu-

tion in value of his vehicle, which is calculated as the difference between the market value of the vehicle immediately prior to
tne accident
repairs.

and the market value

of the vehicle

following

(R. 33-34).

10.

State Farm denied plaintiff's demand on the grounds

that plaintiff's diminution in value claim is not a covered loss
under the State Farm policy.
11.

(R. 34).

Plaintiff sued State Farm, demanding "judgment against

defendant for the amount of the loss which is the difference
between the value of the automobile on the date of the loss and
its

value

immediately

(Complaint, p. 2.;
12.

after

repairs

were

completed.

. . ."

R. 34).

Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment, seeking

an order declaring that the appropriate measure of plaintiff's
damages was the difference in the market value of plaintiff's
vehicle immediately prior to the accident and immediately after
the repairs to the vehicle had been completed.
13.

Defendant

opposed

plaintiff's

(R. 17).

motion

and

filed

a

counter-motion for summary judgment, asserting that, under the
policy,

State

Farm's

liability

repairing plaintiff's vehicle.

was

limited

(R. 30) .
4

to

the

cost

of

14.

The court heard arguments on the parties' motions and

concluded that the State Farm policy was clear and unambiguous.
The court further found that State Farm's liability under the
policy was limited to the cost of repairing plaintiff's vehicle
and dismissed plaintiff's complaint on the merits with prejudice.
15.

From the trial court's award of summary judgment to

defendant State Farm, plaintiff filed this appeal.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant State Farm fully repaired the damage to plaintiff's vehicle. The repairs were not defective in any manner and
fully restored plaintiff's vehicle to its pre-accident condition.
By repairing plaintiff's vehicle in this manner, State Farm fully
satisfied its contractual obligation to plaintiff. The insurance
policy plainly and unambiguously states that:
[State Farm's] liability . . .

"The limit of

is the lower of . . . the actual

cash value [of the vehicle], or . . . the cost of repair or
replacement."

(State Farm Policy; emphasis added).

Plaintiff ignores the clear limitation on coverage quoted
above and argues that State Farm must do more than repair his
vehicle.

Plaintiff claims that the value of his vehicle is

diminished

because

automobile

and

that

of

its

State

status
Farm

is

as

a

liable

previously-damaged
for

this

alleged

diminution in value.
Because there is no language in the insurance policy to support plaintiff's claim, plaintiff instead cites to cases from
other jurisdictions.

This case is governed by the language of
5

the insurance contract, and not by the decisions of other courts.
In any event, in situations where repairs can fully restore a
damaged vehicle to its original physical condition, the courts
overwhelmingly hold that an insurer can properly discharge its
contractual obligation by electing to repair the vehicle. The
majority of authorities cited by plaintiff are easily distinguishable because they involve cases where it was impossible to
repair the damaged vehicle or where repairs were defective.
ARGUMENT
POINT I - STATE FARM'S LIABILITY UNDER THE INSURANCE
POLICY IS LIMITED TO THE COST OF REPAIRING PLAINTIFF'S
VEHICLE.
The simple issue in this case, as recognized by plaintiff,
is whether the State Farm insurance policy extends coverage for
diminution in value. This is purely an issue of policy construction to be resolved by the language of the insurance policy
itself.

The interpretation of a contract is a question of la\*

for the court.

See Morris v. Mountain States Tel, and Tel. Co.,

658 P.2d 1199, 1200-1201 (Utah 1983).
The insurance contract at issue plainly and unambiguously
states up front that the limit of State Farm's liability for loss
to plaintiff's vehicle is the lower of the "actual cash value" of
the vehicle
vehicle.

or the

"cost of repair

or replacement"

of

the

The policy defines "actual cash value" and "cost of

repair or replacement" and gives State Farm the right to elect
which of those two measures of damages it will employ:

6

Limit of Liability Comprehensive and Collision Coverages
The limit of our liability for loss to
property or any part of it is the lower of:
1.

the actual cash value, or

2.

the cost of repair or replacement.

Actual cash value is determined by the
market value, age and condition at the time
the loss occurred. Any deductible amount that
applies is then subtracted.
The cost of
repair or replacement is based upon:
1.

the cost of repair agreed upon by you
and us, or the lower of:
a.

a competitive bid approved by us, or

b.

an estimate written based upon the
prevailing competitive price. The
prevailing competitive price means
labor rates, parts prices and
material prices charged by a
substantial number of the repair
facilities in the area where the
car is to be repaired as determined
by a survey made by us.
If you
ask,
we
will
identify
some
facilities that will perform the
repairs at the prevailing competitive price.

Any deductible amount that applies is then
subtracted.
Settlement of Loss Comprehensive and Collision Coverages
We have the right to settle a loss with vou or
the owner of the property in one of the following ways:
1.

pay up to the actual cash value;

2.

pay to repair or replace the property
or part with like kind and quality.

Addendum, Insurance Contract (emphasis added).
7

The policy language quoted above plainly and unambiguously
limits State Farm's liability to "the lower of . . . the actual
cash value, or . . . the cost of repair or replacement." Id, It
is hard to imagine a less ambiguous way to express this limitation.

The limitation is made effective by additional language

giving State Farm the right to elect either the "cash value" or
"cost of repair" measure of damages.
repairing plaintiff's vehicle was

Inasmuch as the cost of

lower than the vehicle's

alleged pre-accident cash value, State Farm properly chose to
discharge its obligation by restoring plaintiff's vehicle to its
original physical condition.

State Farm did not breach the

insurance contract by selecting the "cost of repair" as the
measure of damages, as recognized by the trial court.
Plaintiff asserts repeatedly in his brief that the State
Farm policy requires State Farm to pay plaintiff for the alleged
diminution in value to his vehicle. However, most of plaintiff's
assertions are made without any citation to or quotation of the
insurance contract.

It is not until the very end of plaintiff's

brief that plaintiff makes an attempt to show how the insurance
contract supports plaintiff's position. This attempt is found in
a single paragraph that is confusing and difficult to understand.
Plaintiff is apparently alleging that the phrase "repair or
replace with like kind and quality" means that the insurer must
repair the value of the vehicle, rather than the physical damage:
The language in the policy which requires an
insurer to "repair or replace" the damaged
automobile with "like kind or quality" . . .
certainly means that the purpose of the
8

policy is to compensate the insured for any
loss or damage, less the deductible. If the
vehicle cannot be repaired so that it is
worth what it was before the accident, then
it needs to be replaced. It appears that
the trial court in this case focused on the
concept of replacing "parts and components
with like kind and quality." . . . The
vehicle must be looked at as a whole and not
as constituent parts and components.
Appellants Brief, pp. 7-8.
Plaintiffs argument that "repair or replace" means a repair
of value rather than a repair of physical damage is not supported
by the language of the insurance contract. As previously quoted,
the insurance contract limits State Farm's liability to the
lesser of "the actual cash value" of the damaged vehicle, or "the
cost of repair or replacement."

The phrase "actual cash value"

is defined in the policy as the market value of the vehicle at
the time of the accident, less the deductible, which is the
measure of damages plaintiff is seeking in this case. The phrase
"cost of repair or replacement" is defined by the policy as
follows:
the cost of repair agreed upon by you and us,
or the lower of;
a.

a competitive bid approved by us, or

b.

an estimate written based upon the
prevailing competitive price.
The
prevailing competitive price means
labor rates, parts prices and material
prices charged by a substantial number
of the repair facilities in the area
where the car is to be repaired as
determined by a survey made by us. If
you ask, we will
identify
some
facilities that will perform the

9

repairs at the prevailing competitive
price.
Any deductible amount that applies is then
subtracted.
Addendum, Insurance Contract (emphasis added).
As demonstrated, the phrase "cost of repair or replacement"
is defined as the cost of repairing the actual physical damage to
plaintiff's vehicle.

The phrase does not require State Farm to

restore the vehicle to its previous "cash value."

That is only

required under the "cash value" measure of damages. Plaintiff is
attempting to turn the "cost of repair" formula into the "cash
value"

formula.

insurance
repair

Under

contract, State

or

replace

the

plaintiff's
Farm's

damaged

interpretation

clear

contractual

vehicle would

be

of
right

the
to

effectively

removed and all language pertaining to such a right would be
rendered meaningless and superfluous.
Courts

guard

against

a

party's

attempt

to

create

an

ambiguity in an unambiguous contract by employing the rule that
insurance policies must be considered as a whole, and not in
piecemeal fashion.
08

(Utah 1982).

See Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107When the relevant portions of the insurance

contract at issue are constructed as a whole, it is readily
apparent that State Farm's liability is limited to the lesser of
the cost of repairing plaintiff's vehicle or the diminution in
value to the vehicle. Plaintiff's creative interpretation of the
insurance policy is simply an attempt to create an ambiguity
where none exists.
10

The Utah Supreme Court has held that "policy terms are not
necessarily ambiguous simply because one party seeks to endow
them with a different interpretation according to his or her own
interests."

Alf v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272,

1274-75 (Utah 1993).

The court should not construe the insurance

policy "through the magnifying eye of the technical lawyer."
Drauahon v. Cuna Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 771 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah App.
1989) .

The trial court recognized this principle and correctly

held that the insurance policy at issue is "clear and unambiguous."

(Addendum, Order on Summary Judgment).

See Alf, 8 50 P.2d

at 1274 ("whether an ambiguity exists in a contract is a question
of law.").

This ruling was correct and should be affirmed.

Also, the court should note that the insurance policy at
issue in this case was a preprinted contract that was filed with
the Insurance Commissioner.

As pointed out by the Utah Supreme

Court in Allen v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798
(Utah 1992) , under the Utah Code "the commissioner may disapprove
a preprinted policy at any time if it is found to be inequitable,
unfairly

discriminatory,

encourages

misleading,

misrepresentation."

citations omitted).

Id.

deceptive,
at

804

obscure,

(quotations

or
and

Consequently, "the validity of preprinted

insurance contracts is premised on executive approval."

Id.

In

such situations the court adheres to "the principle of deferring
to

legislative policy

insurance provisions."

in considering the facial validity of
Id. at 805.

11

The court thus enforces

insurance policies as written, unless they are clearly contrary
to public policy,
POINT II - THE MAJORITY RULE ALLOWS INSURERS TO DISCHARGE THEIR CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS BY FULLY REPAIRING
A DAMAGED VEHICLE AND RETURNING THE VEHICLE TO ITS
ORIGINAL PHYSICAL CONDITION.
Plaintiff apparently argues that State Farm must elect the
"cash value" measure of damages, rather than the "cost of repair
or replacement" measure authorized by contract.

Because the

insurance policy does not support his argument, plaintiff cites
to cases from other jurisdictions.
value.

Such an attempt is of little

This case involves a contractual dispute where the

rights, duties, and obligations of the parties are governed by
the terms of the contract.

The duties of the parties are not

established by cases from other jurisdictions.
In any event, many of the authorities relied upon by plaintiff are easily distinguishable because they involve situations
where it was impossible to repair the vehicle or where repairs
were undertaken, but performed in a defective manner.

See

Venable v. Import Volkswagen, Inc., 519 P.2d 667, 670 (Kan.
1974); Annotation, 43 A.L.R.2d 327 (1955).

Quite obviously, in

situations where physical repairs are impossible or defective an
insurer cannot discharge its obligations by having the vehicle
repaired.

See Venable, 519 P.2d at 672. However, where repairs

are possible and do substantially return the vehicle to its
former physical condition, as in the instant case, the majority
of courts routinely allow insurers to discharge their obligations
by electing to repair the damaged vehicle:
12

It is generally held or recognized, under
insurance contracts similar to the one in
the present case, that when a damaged
automobile cannot be repaired, it is a total
loss, and the liability of the insurer is
the difference in the actual cash value of
the car immediately before and after the
accident, less the amount stipulated in the
deductible clause.
On the other hand, if
the automobile is not a total loss and can
be repaired, the liability of the insurer is
to pay only the cost of repairs, less the
amount provided for in the deductible
clause,
Bickel v. Nationwide Hut. Ins, Co,, 143 S.E.2d 903, 905 (Va.
1965) (emphasis added).

See also Ray v. Farmers Ins, Exchange,

246 Cal.Rptr. 593, 596 (Cal. App. 1988) (Where repair substantially

restores vehicle

to

its original

physical

condition,

insurer's liability is limited to repair costs and insurer is not
liable for diminution in value); Brooks v. Capital Fleets, 123
A.2d 916, 917 (D.C. App. 1956) ("Where damages to an automobile
are such that they may reasonably be repaired, restoring the
vehicle to substantially its condition prior to the injury, the
measure of damage is the fair and reasonable cost of repairs.");
National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Watson, 298 P.2d 762,
766-67

(Okla. 1956)

(If damaged vehicle can be substantially

restored to its original physical condition, measure of insurer's
liability

is the cost of repairs; otherwise the measure of

liability is the diminished value of the vehicle); National Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Dalton. 214 S.W.2d 507, 509 (Ark. 1948) (Insurer's
liability

is limited to repair costs unless the repairs are

performed in a defective manner, in which case the insurer's
liability becomes the diminished value of the vehicle.).
13

On page 5 of his brief, plaintiff quotes 15 Couch On
Insurance 2nd § 54:30 (2nd ed. 1983).
plaintiff

supports

the majority

view

The language quoted by
that

an

insurer

can

discharge its obligation by repairing a damaged vehicle where
repairs are possible. This is supported by additional statements
from the same treatise that were not quoted by plaintiff:
It is not uncommon for a contract
property insurance to give the insurer
option to repair, restore, or replace
damaged property in lieu of paying for
insured loss. Such a condition is valid
. . fid, at § 54:10).

of
the
the
the
..

* * *

In harmony with the foregoing, an automobile
collision policy provision that the limit of
liability shall not exceed the actual cash
value of the automobile or what it would
cost to repair or replace the automobile
with another of like kind and quality . . .
gives the insurer the right to repair the
automobile if it can be repaired and placed
in substantially the same condition as
before. . . . (Id. at § 54:29).
* * *

Where the insurer exercises its option and
properly repairs or rebuilds thereunder,
such performance is a defense to any action
on the policy.
(Id. at § 54:33 (emphasis
added)).
Utah apparently follows the majority rule detailed above and
allows an insurer to elect to repair a damaged vehicle when repairs can restore the vehicle to its original physical condition.
This is evidenced by the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in
S e w v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co.. 334 P.2d 554 (Utah 1959):
Generally, car damage is determinable by
expert testimony as to repair cost, or by
14

showing the differential in market value
before and after the incident initiating the
damage•
Id.
Plaintiff's brief implies that most jurisdictions only allow
an insurer to elect the "cash value" measure of damages and cites
to Section 4 of 43 A.L.R.2d 327 (1955) in support of this proposition.

However, plaintiff fails to point out that the cases

cited in Section 4 only applied the "cash value" formula because
repairs to the vehicle were impossible or defective.

Plaintiff

also fails to mention Section 3 of that same annotation, which
cites a greater number of instances where courts applied the
"cost of repair or replacement" formula because the physical
damage was repairable.
In the instant case it is undisputed that the physical
damage to plaintiff's vehicle was fully and competently repaired.
As a result, the appropriate measure of State Farm's liability
is the cost associated with the vehicle's repair.

This is

evidenced by numerous authorities.
In Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 754 P.2d 330
(Ariz. App. 1988) State Farm elected to repair the plaintiff's
damaged vehicle.

The repairs were not defective in any way.

Nonetheless, the plaintiff demanded an additional $3,000 payment
from State Farm for alleged diminution in value to her vehicle.
State Farm denied the claim on the grounds that State Farm's
liability was limited under the policy to the cost of repairing
the plaintiff's vehicle.

The insurance policy at issue was the
15

same State Farm policy at issue in the instant case.

The

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment for State Farm,
finding that the State Farm policy was not ambiguous and did not
extend coverage for diminution in value:
[N]owhere in the policy does there appear
any language which requires State Farm
either to restore the vehicle to its preaccident condition or to pay the insured the
difference in value after the accident as
opposed to before. We also do not find any
ambiguous language in the provision at
issue.
A review of the cases cited convinces us
that the better view is that State Farm's
liability is limited by the terms of the
policy to the cost of repairing the vehicle
less any deductible payable by the insured.
* * *

We note that many of the cases fplaintiff 1
has cited to us involved different facts
than the case before us. In several of the
cases, the parties disputed the extent of
damages and repairs required so that no
repairs had yet been made, or there was a
claim that the repairs made were defective.
Id. at 331 (emphasis added).
The Johnson court

also recognized

that any

award for

diminution in value would, in essence, rewrite the State Farm
policy

so as to arbitrarily

remove

State Farm's

right of

election:
We agree with the trial court that under the
provisions of the insurance contract and the
evidence here, plaintiff's measure of damages is
not the difference in the market value of the
automobile immediately before and after the
collision. The contract of insurance does not so
provide. To apply such measure of damages would
be arbitrarily reading out of the policy the
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right of defendant to make repairs, or replace
the damaged part with materials of like kind and
gualify.
Id. at 3 31 (quoting Bickel v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 143
S.E.2d 903 (Va. 1965) (emphasis added)).
A similar "diminution in value" claim was made under a
substantively identical policy in Ray v. Farmers Ins. Exchange,
246 Cal.Rptr. 593 (Cal. App. 1988). In that case the plaintiff's
vehicle was damaged by a UPS truck. The plaintiff made a demand
for coverage against UPS7 insurer, Liberty Mutual, and against
his own insurer, Farmers Insurance Exchange.

Both insurers

agreed to have the vehicle repaired, but both refused to pay
plaintiff for the alleged diminution in value to his vehicle. At
trial evidence was introduced that the market value of vehicles
that have undergone significant repair is always less than the
market value of vehicles that have never been damaged.

When

judgment was rendered against the plaintiff, he appealed to the
California Court of Appeals.

The appellate court affirmed,

finding that the insurance policy was not ambiguous, that the
policy did not extend coverage for diminution in value when
repairs could restore the vehicle to its original physical
condition, and that the court could not award "diminution in
value" damages without rewriting the insurance contract:
The policy unambiguously gave Farmers the
right to elect to repair fplaintiff'si
vehicle if the cost to repair . . . was less
than the actual cash value of the vehicle at
the time of loss.
* * *
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As a practical matter, one may assume that
any
automobile
sustaining
significant
collision damage will lose some market value
after repairs. To hold Farmers liable for
the automobile's diminution in value would
make Farmers an insurer of the automobile's
cash value in virtually all cases and would
render essentially meaningless its clear
right to elect to repair rather than to pay
the actual cash value of the vehicle at the
time of loss.
* * *

The policy language unambiguously reserves
to Farmers the right to elect the most
economical
method
of
paving
claims.
[Plaintiff's] strained interpretation would
gut that right and hold Farmers to a risk it
did not contemplate nor one for which
[plaintiff] paid.
* * *

We will not rewrite an otherwise unambiguous
limitation of collision coverage to provide
for a risk not bargained for. To the extent
fplaintiff'si automobile was repaired to its
pre-accident safe, mechanical, and cosmetic
condition. Farmers' obligation under the
policy of insurance to repair to "like kind
and quality" was discharged.
Id. at 595-96 (emphasis added, citations and quotations omitted).
In Uniguard Ins. Co. v. Wish. 496 S.W.2d 392 (Ark. 1973),
the court issued a similar holding.

In that case the plaintiff

rejected his insurer's offer to pay to repair his damaged
vehicle, claiming that, under the policy, he was entitled to
recover for the diminution value to his vehicle.

The policy

limited the insurance company's liability to the lesser of the
actual cash value of the vehicle or the cost of repair.

At

trial, expert testimony was introduced to the effect that "a used
car on a used car lot that has been wrecked is just not worth as
18

much as another car of the same kind that hasn't been wrecked."
Id. at 393.

However, no evidence was introduced establishing

that the vehicle could not be repaired.

When the trial court

awarded plaintiff damages for diminution in value, the insurer
appealed.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the trial

court, holding that the proper measure of damages is the cost of
repair, rather than the actual cash value, when the vehicle can
be restored to its original physical condition:
In order for the judgment which was entered
against appellant to have been given, it was
necessary that the circuit court find that
the measure of appellee's damages was the
difference between the value of his automobile immediately before and immediately
following the accident rather than the cost
of repairs. We think, under the terms of
the policy that this finding was erroneous
and cases cited by appellee are clearly
distinguishable.
* * *

A property damage limitation of liability is
valid and . . . recovery is dependent upon
the terms of the contract rather than on the
difference in the before and after value of
the vehicle. If [the cash value] figure had
been equal to or less than the amount necessary to repair the car, appellee could have
recovered the difference between the before
and after value. But such is not the case.
. . .
Of course, our finding would be
different if the testimony reflected the
[plaintiff's] automobile to have been a
total loss.
But there is no evidence to
that effect in the record.
The only
evidence
on this point by
appellee's
witnesses was that a wrecked automobile
which had been repaired was never as
valuable for re-sale purposes as one which
had not been wrecked. Not a single person
testified that the care was a total loss.
Id. at 394, 395 (emphasis added).
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Another case reaching the same result is General Accident
Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Judd. 400 S.W.2d 685 (Ky. App.
1966) .

In Judd the plaintiff was also claiming damages for

diminution in value to her vehicle under a policy that limited
the insurer's liability to the lesser of the actual cash value of
the vehicle or the cost of repair. The trial court gave the jury
an instruction authorizing the jury to award plaintiff damages
based upon the cash value of her vehicle, rather than the cost of
repair, even though there was no evidence establishing that the
vehicle could not be repaired.

This was held to be reversible

error:
There was no evidence whatever that plaintiff's automobile could not have been . . .
restored. It may be true, as an automobile
dealer testified, that a car that has been
wrecked can never be fully restored to its
market value before the accident, but the
insurance contract does not require a
restoration of value:
it requires only a
restoration of physical
condition.
* * *

In concluding, it occurs to us that the
first
and
fundamental
question
for
submission to the jury in this case is
whether plaintiff's automobile could have
been restored in substantially as good
physical or operating condition as before
the accident. . . . If so, plaintiff has no
cause of action, since the [insurance]
company offered her [the cost of repair].
Id. at 687-88 (underlining added).
The same results have been reached in other cases.

See

e.g. , Hounihan v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. , 441 S.W.2d 58
(Mo. App. 1969) ("Policy provisions similar to those [in the
20

instant case] . . . limit the insurer's liability and fix the
maximum recovery which can be had under the policy.
[Defendant] was entitled to show that the cost of a replacement
was less than the amount claimed by plaintiff to be the diminution in value. . . . " ) ; Riley v. National Auto Ins. Co. , 77
N.W.2d 241 (Neb. 1956) (Where the insurance policy limited the
insurer's liability to the lesser of cash value or cost of repair
and gave the insurer an election between the two measures of
damages, and where there was evidence that the plaintiff's
damaged vehicle could be substantially repaired, it was error for
the trial court to instruct the jury to apply the "cash value"
measure of damages.).
As the preceding authorities demonstrate, the majority of
courts recognize and uphold as valid a provision in an insurance
policy that limits the liability of the insurer to the lesser of
the cash value of the vehicle or the cost of repair. In conjunction with this limitation, the courts also enforce and uphold
provisions giving the insurer an election between the "cash
value" and "cost of repair" measure of damages.

The only time

that the majority of courts refuse to enforce the insurer's right
of election is when the damaged vehicle cannot be substantially
restored to its original physical condition.

A number of the

authorities relied upon by plaintiff fall into this latter
category, and thus do not support plaintiff's position, but
rather

support the majority

view.

See Venable v.

Import

Volkswagen, Inc.. 519 P.2d 667, 670-71 (Kan. 1974); 15 Couch On
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Insurance

2d

§ 54:30

(2d ed.

1983);

Annot. 43 A.L.R.2d
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Section 4 (1955).
The principal case relied upon by plaintiff is Delledonne v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co,. 621 A.2d 350 (Del. Super. Ct.
1992).

Delledonne's value as precedent is lessened by the fact

that it is not the decision of an appellate court, but rather is
a published trial court opinion.

Delledonne's persuasive value

is further lessened by the fact that the cases it relies upon are
all

either

miscited

or

distinguishable.

While

Delledonne

suggests that the majority of jurisdictions require an insurer to
pay for diminution in value even when a vehicle can be repaired,
this is simply untrue.
actually

involved

Most of the cases cited by Delledonne

situations where the vehicle could

not be

restored to its original physical condition or where repairs were
defective, and thus are consistent with the majority rule.
Dodson Aviation v. Rollins, 807 P.2d

1319

(Kan. App.

See

1991);

Venable. 519 P.2d at 672-73; Rossier v. Union Auto. Ins. Co., 291
P.

498, 500

(Or. 1930).

The remaining

two cases

cited

in

Delledonne are distinguishable by the fact that neither of the
insurance policies in those cases defined the phrase "cost of
repair or replacement," and consequently the courts interpreted
that phrase to mean that the insurer had to repair the value of
the damaged vehicle, rather than the actual property damage.

See

Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Cope, 448 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Texas
App.

1969); Campbell v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 109 S.E.2d 572

(S.C. 1959) . Plaintiff's brief actually quotes a portion of the
22

Campbell case.

In the instant case the phrase "cost of repair or

replacement" is defined in the insurance policy so as to eliminate any ambiguity and to clearly establish that the phrase only
refers to the repair of physical damage. Delledonne thus constitutes questionable support for plaintiff's position.
The

majority

of

courts

adhere

to

contractual

language

limiting the insurer's liability to the lesser of the actual cash
value of the vehicle or the cost of repair.
goes against this majority rule.

Plaintiff's argument

Plaintiff's argument

also

destroys an insurer's right to limit the scope of its coverage,
a right which has been preserved to insurers by the Utah Supreme
Court:
An insurer has the right to contract with an
insured as to the risks it will or will not
assume, as long as neither statutory law nor
public policy is violated. Thus an insurer
may include in a policy any number or kind
of exceptions and limitations to which an
insured will agree unless contrary to
statute or public policy.
Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d

231, 233

(Utah

1985).
Public policy concerns also demand that plaintiff's argument
be rejected.

It is undisputed that plaintiff's vehicle has been

fully restored to its original physical condition.
cosmetic or mechanical defects.

There are no

Consequently, it necessarily

follows that the future life of plaintiff's vehicle has not been
diminished and that plaintiff should have the use of his vehicle
for the same amount of time that he would have been able to use
the vehicle prior to the accident.
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If plaintiff now prevails in

his argument and successfully recovers the $15,000 that he is
demanding from State Farm, plaintiff will have received a windfall. In addition to having the full use of his vehicle over the
normal

life

of

the vehicle, plaintiff

will

additional money for his own use and benefit.

have

received

In essence, State

Farm will be subsidizing plaintiff's purchase of the automobile.
Such an approach provides insureds with an incentive to damage
their vehicles and contradicts public policy.
CONCLUSION
The insurance contract entered into by the parties plainly
and unambiguously limits State Farm's liability to the lower of
the actual cash value of plaintiff's vehicle or the cost of
repairing plaintiff's vehicle. State Farm elected to repair the
vehicle and fully restored the vehicle to its original physical
condition, thereby discharging its obligation under the contract.
While plaintiff claims that the policy requires State Farm to
elect the "cash value" measure of damages, plaintiff's argument
is not supported by the plain language of the insurance contract.
The trial court thus properly dismissed plaintiff's complaint.
Because the insurance contract does not support plaintiff's
argument, plaintiff instead cites to cases from other jurisdictions.

These cases are irrelevant.

The responsibilities and

duties of the parties are determined by the provisions of the
insurance contract.

The court cannot rule in plaintiff's favor

without re-writing the contract. If the court does consider case
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law, the court should follow the rule of a majority of courts and
uphold the coverage limitation.
Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim against State
Farm for breach of contract.

State Farm's liability under the

contract was discharged when State Farm fully repaired plaintiff's vehicle.

The trial court recognized this and properly

awarded

judgment to defendant.

summary

The trial court's

decision should be affirmed,
DATED this

c?7^7

day of ^&^tf

Jdsf^t??^^

, 1994

*afrl M. Belnap
David R. Nielson
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent

r
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
E. MARLOW GOBLE,
|

ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I

Civil No. 930000023

Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY
COMPANY,
Defendant.

]
i

Judge Clinton s. Judkins

]

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on December
14, 1993, on the cross motions for summary judgment filed by the
parties before the Honorable Clinton S. Judkins,
The court reviewed the memoranda submitted by counsel and
having heard the arguments of counsel and there being no disputed
material issues of fact, the court is of the opinion that the
terms and conditions of the State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance policy in Section IV—Physical Damage Coverages, and in
particular, under the terms and conditions of said policy under
the provisions of "Limit of Liability—Comprehensive and
Collision Coverages" and "Settlement of Loss—Comprehensive and
Collision Coverages" are clear and unambiguous.

The court determines that the settlement of the loss was
appropriately concluded by State Farm in accordance with the
terms and provisions of the insurance policy in repairing the
vehicle with parts and components of like kind and quality.
Therefore, it is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the motion of

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company for summary
judgment is hereby granted and the motion of the plaintiff is
hereby denied and judgment is granted in favor of the defendant
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company dismissing the
claims of the plaintiff, with prejudice,
DATED this

3 ^ d a y of

F^v^^w^

, 1994.

BY THE COURT:
S/ CLINT S.JUDKIMS

C l i n t ^ s. Judkins
F i r s t D i s t r i c t Court Judge
Approved^as t o Form:

SECTION l\

PHYSICAL DAMAGE COVERAGE

Loss - means, when used in this section, each direct and
accidental loss of or damage to:

Clothes and Luggage - Comprehensive and Collision
Coverages
We
will pay for bss to clothes and luggage owned by the
1. your car;
first
person named in the declarations, his or her spouse, and
2. its equipment which is common to the use of your
their relatives. These items have to be in or on your car.
car as a vehicle; or
Your car has to be covered under this policy fon
3. clothes and luggage insured; and
1. Comprehensive, and the bss .caused by fire,'
4. a detachable living quarters attached or removed
lightning, flood, falling objects, explosion,
from your car for storage. Detachable living
earthquake or theft If the bss is due to theft,
quarters includes its body and items securely fixed
YOUR ENTIRE CAR MUST HAVE BEEN
in place as a permanent part of the body. Kwmust
STOLEN; or
have told us about the living quarters before the loss
and paid any extra premium needed
2. Collision, and the bss caused by cotEsbru
COMPREHENSIVE
COVERAGE
D.
You
have
this
We will pay up to S200 for bss to clothes and luggage in
coverage if **DH appears in the "Coverages" space on the excess of any deductible amount shown for comprehensive
declarations page. If a deductible
applies, the amount is or collision. S200 is the most we win pay in any one
shown by the number beside **DW.
occurrence even though mote than one person has a bss.
1. Loss to Your Car. We will pay for bss to yo urcar This coverage is excess over any other coverage.
Limit of liability - Comprehensive and Collision Coverages
m EXCEPT LOSSBY COLt/5/O/Vbutonlyfoxthe
amount of each such bss u excess of the deductible
The limit of our liability for bss to property or any part of
amount, if any.
it is the lower of:
Breakage of glass, or bss caused by missiles, falling
objects, fire, theft, larceny, explosion, earthquake,
1. the actual cash value, or
windstorm, hail, water, flood, malicious mischief or
2. the cost of repair or replacement
vandalism, riot or civil commotion, is payable
under this coverage. Loss due to hitting or being- Actual cash value is determined by the market value, age
hit by a bird or an animal is payable under this and condition at the time the bss occurred Any deductible
coverage.
amount that applies is then subtracted The cost of repair
2/. We will repay you for transportation costs if your orreplacementis based upon:
car is stolen. We will pay up to $16 per day for the
1. the cost ofrepairagreed upon by you and us, or
period that begins 48 hours after jw< tell us of the
theft. The penod ends when we offer to pay for
2. the lower of:
bss.
a." a competitive bid approved by us, or .
b. an estimate written based upon the prevailing
COLUSION - 80% - COVERAGE F. You have this
competitive price. The prevailing competitive
coverage if " P appears in the •'Coverages*' space on the
price means labor rates, parts prices and
declarations page.
material prices charged by a substantial
We wQl pay 80% of the first $250 and 100% over that
number or therepairfacilities in the area where
amount ofbssioyour car caused by collision. K the collision
the car is to be repaired as determined by a
is with another motor vehicle insured by us, we will pay
survey made by us. It you ask, we will identify
100% of the to*.
some facilities that will perform therepairsat
the prevailing competitive price.
COLUSION
COVERAGE
G.
You
have
this
coverage
ifa G" appears in the "Coverages" space on the declarations
page. The deductible amount is shown by the number beside Any deductible amount that applies is then subtracted.
Settlement of Loss - Comprehensive and Coffiskm
**cr.
We wiH pay for bss to your car caused by coUisbn but only Coverages
for the amount of each such bss in excess of the deductible We have the right to settle a bss with jw/ or the owner of
amount If the couTson is with another motor vehicle the property in one of the following ways:
insured with us, j w d o not pay jwtr deductible if it is S100
or less as we pay it
I. pay up to the actual cash value:
ColBsbn - means your car upset or hit or was hit by a
1 pay torepairorreplacethe property or part with
vehicle or other object
like kind and quality. If the repair or replacement
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